

# A Nationwide Census on WiFi Security Threats: Prevalence, Riskiness, and the Economics

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## ABSTRACT

Carrying over 75% of the last-mile mobile Internet traffic, WiFi has inevitably become an enticing target for various security threats. In this work, we characterize a wide variety of real-world WiFi threats at an unprecedented scale, involving 19 million WiFi access points (APs) mostly located in China, by deploying a crowdsourced security checking system on 14 million mobile devices in the wild. Leveraging the collected data, we reveal the landscape of nationwide WiFi threats for the first time. We find that the prevalence, riskiness, and breakdown of WiFi threats deviate significantly from common understandings and prior studies. In particular, we detect attacks at around 4% of all WiFi APs, uncover that most WiFi attacks are driven by an underground economy, and provide strong evidence of web analytics platforms being the bottleneck of its monetization chain. Further, we provide insightful guidance for defending against WiFi attacks at scale, and some of our efforts have already yielded real-world impact—effectively disrupted the WiFi attack ecosystem.

## CCS CONCEPTS

• Security and privacy → Mobile and wireless security; Economics of security and privacy.

## KEYWORDS

WiFi & Mobile Security; Threat Ecosystem; Countermeasures.

### ACM Reference Format:

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## 1 INTRODUCTION

More than 75% of the last-mile Internet traffic of today’s mobile systems is delivered via WiFi [29], which thereby has also become an

enticing target for various security threats [15, 45, 88]. Criminals exploit security vulnerabilities of WiFi access points (APs) [4, 55, 88] to eavesdrop on wireless traffic [27], to launch phishing attacks through DNS hijacking [15], and to directly generate profits through cryptojacking [45]. Furthermore, adversaries not only compromise existing WiFi APs, but also deploy malicious WiFi-based edge devices [40, 51]. Currently, WiFi-based attacks have become nationwide security threats, affecting hundreds of millions of end users.

**Census Methodology.** To comprehensively understand nationwide WiFi threats, we take a unique opportunity to collaborate with WiFi-Manager (actual name anonymized), a crowdsourcing-based WiFi discovery and management service used by 800+ million (M) Android devices across 200+ countries/regions. It helps Android systems automatically discover accessible WiFi APs with Internet connectivity, by crowdsourcing the connectivity information and statistics contributed by the numerous live devices—each user device serves as a tester for a given WiFi AP. Leveraging this massive-scale crowdsourcing platform, we build a WiFi security checking system, which we call WiSC (WiFi Security Checker), integrated in WiFi-Manager as an optional function. WiSC enables us to measure a wide variety of real-world WiFi threats at an unprecedented scale.

Running on a massive number of heterogeneous mobile devices requires WiSC to address three challenges: 1) *no root privilege access*, as WiFiManager needs to be a pure user-space app to register wide deployment; 2) *achieving a good detection coverage while maintaining high precision*, both being crucial to a comprehensive and in-depth understanding of the WiFi threat ecosystem; and 3) *no long-term traffic monitoring* to avoid excessive resource consumption on mobile devices and to minimize users’ privacy concerns.

To tackle these issues, we judiciously engineer our attack detection framework. Deployed atop a regular Android app, WiSC utilizes generic system APIs with limited system privileges to detect attacks on both LAN and WAN. As a result, our threat model targets attacks mainly occurring at upper layers, including ARP/DHCP spoofing in LAN and TCP/DNS hijacking in WAN; for other attacks operating at the MAC/PHY layer, we cannot detect them since WiSC has no privileged access to WiFi modem and other hardware components. To balance the detection accuracy and resource overhead, WiSC conducts the detection through a novel two-stage pipeline, by first capturing suspicious attacks in a fast and resource-efficient manner, followed by a more detailed scrutiny to rule out possible false positives. Specifically, for LAN-side attacks, WiSC performs *cross-connection gateway-consistency detection* (§2.2) by leveraging a common usage scenario where user devices are repeatedly connected to the same AP; it overcomes limitations in traditional detection schemes [26, 58]. For WAN-side attacks, we develop a

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*cross-layer decoy-based detection* scheme (§2.3), where we instrument carefully-crafted decoy packets to extensively trigger primary WAN attacks and analyze the attack risks by synthesizing cross-layer information. Combining the above efforts, WiSC manages to realize accurate attack detection on commodity Android devices within 5 seconds, incurring less than 10 KB of network traffic.


Under user consent and a well-established IRB, WiSC collected measurement data from 14M user devices upon 19M WiFi APs, over a period of six months (10/2018 – 04/2019). The data analysis enabled us to develop a holistic understanding of WiFi threats, with a number of novel insights.

**Prevalence and Riskiness.** We detect attacks at 3.92% of the examined WiFi APs. The percentage is significantly higher than those (0.21%–1.5%) reported by small-scale studies [67, 69]. A key reason is that prior studies omit attacks that are considered difficult to launch given today’s seemingly strengthened mobile OS and network protocols. In particular, common sense suggests that given the increasing adoption of HTTPS, web content manipulation such as advertisement (ad) injection is unlikely to occur. Nevertheless, our findings indicate that the majority (55%) of our detected attacks remain ad injections. We attribute this to the prevalent *misconfigurations of HTTPS* in the real world. We find (and confirm through controlled experiments) that ad injections can be successfully launched towards popular HTTPS-equipped content providers (*e.g.*, TMall [83], BBC [11], and Shopify [71]) due to improper HTTPS configurations. For example, a lack of HTTP Strict Transport Security (HSTS) allows an HTTPS session to fall back to HTTP, making SSL/TLS stripping attack and henceforth ad injection feasible. Worse still, even among equipped with HSTS, most do not properly configure the HSTS parameters (*e.g.*, timeout threshold and preload list).

Counter-intuitively, we notice that ad injections are more likely to occur on better protected APs: 2.3% of the APs using strong encryption (WPA/WPA2) *vs.* 1% of the APs with no or weak encryption (WEP). We attribute this to the statistically better Internet connectivity of the APs with stronger encryption. The results indicate that common practices for enhancing WiFi security are not that effective when confronting today’s sophisticated, mature cybercrime market.

Within the LAN, we identify both ARP and DHCP spoofings. While ARP spoofing has been reported before [24, 84], DHCP spoofing was mostly deemed as a hypothetical form of attack under WiFi environments due to the high cost of launching it [56, 87]. Nonetheless, our observation refutes this by revealing that DHCP spoofing is as feasible as other popular attacks in practice. We observe a considerable fraction (25%) of APs are subject to poor network connectivity with user devices, and such poor network conditions substantially increase the success rate of DHCP spoofing.

**Economics Behind.** Next, we go beyond basic characterizations by revealing the economics behind WiFi threats: *what are attackers’ key decisions for maximizing their profits?* A major finding is that APs under LAN attacks (ARP/DHCP spoofing) exhibit significant physical movements (median of 724 m) during our measurement; in comparison, APs under WAN attacks and benign APs are quite stationary (median of 31 m and 21 m respectively). This can be explained by our observation that LAN attacks are more likely to succeed under poor LAN environments, which in turn can easily arouse network administrators’ vigilance and defensive measures.



**Figure 1: The underground ecosystem of WiFi attacks uncovered by our census. Advertisers pay the adversaries typically based on the ad-effect reports generated and signed by third-party, legitimate web analytics platforms.**

Thus, adversaries need to strategically relocate to increase the success rate and evade detection. Notably, 10% of the APs under LAN attacks even manifest a clear pattern of shifting among several locations, forming one or multiple loops.

Perhaps more surprisingly, we notice that most adversaries do not inject ads to every web page visited by a victim user. Instead, they opportunistically perform ad injections at a low probability of ~17%. The rationale for such “low-rate” attacks is that high-frequency ad injections are more likely to incur users’ complaints and henceforth AP reset, AP firmware upgrade, or even AP disconnection, causing the attacker to lose the compromised AP. The attacker therefore needs to tune the injection frequency to maximize the profit. We mathematically model the attacker’s revenue, and find that the modeling results well support our hypothesis—the maximum profit appears at an ad injection probability of 15%, close to the measurement observation (17% on average).

Further, our end-to-end analysis on ad-injection attack unravels its underground ecosystem centered around the monetization chain. As depicted in Figure 1, adversaries first collect ad requirements from advertisers (①), and then distribute *visible* ads to victim users via compromised or maliciously deployed APs (②③④); after that, according to the ad-effect reports generated and signed by web analytics platforms (⑤⑥⑦⑧), adversaries get paid by the advertisers (⑨). Our key insight is that the legitimate web analytics platforms are abused by the attackers; however, they are also the bottlenecks (*i.e.*, “cut points”) in the monetization chain—almost all of the injected ads are monetized using only four web analytics platforms. We have reported our findings to the four platforms, leading to defensive intervention that effectively disrupted the WiFi attack ecosystem. For example, Baidu Analytics have responded to us and stopped serving 67% of the reported ad links, leading to 49.8% of decrease of ad injections as of August 2020.

**Broader Impact.** We acknowledge that most of the WiFi APs in our study are located in China. It is worth mentioning that we also detect extensive WiFi attacks in many other countries where WiFi-Manager is widely used. In some countries (*e.g.*, Burma and Russia), the fraction of malicious APs is even larger than 4%, as shown in Table 2. Hence, we feel that our study also provides valuable insights for combating WiFi security threats outside China. Owing to

its prominent impact in understanding and mitigating WiFi threats in the wild, WiSC is now an official component of the production WiFiManager system.

## 2 STUDY METHODOLOGY

We first outline how the WiSC system works (§2.1). We then explain in detail our detection schemes for LAN (§2.2) and WAN (§2.3) attacks. Finally, we describe our large-scale deployment (§2.5).

### 2.1 WiSC System Overview

To address the three design challenges mentioned in §1, we develop a novel two-stage pipeline to detect the abovementioned LAN and WAN attacks. It first efficiently captures suspicious events, and then scrutinizes them to remove false positives, thus ensuring a high detection accuracy and low resource footprint. WiSC’s architecture is illustrated in Figure 2. On the UI (user interface) of WiFiManager there is a “Security Checking” button<sup>1</sup>; once clicked, WiSC starts the LAN attack detection (§2.2) by first retrieving (Step ①) and then examining (Step ②) related LAN information. To detect WAN attacks (§2.3), WiSC first performs a transport-layer detection (Step ③) by sending decoy IP packets to the connected AP to determine whether it is *suspicious*. For a suspicious AP, WiSC further launches the application-layer detection (Step ④) to rule out possible false positives, by checking DNS responses and modifications to an instrumented decoy web page from our own server. The detection results, along with the LAN information, received responses of sent decoys, and the device’s location data collected via GPS or cellular base-station localization, are then encrypted and uploaded via the connected AP to our log server (Step ⑤⑥).

**Ethical Consideration.** All analysis tasks in this study comply with the agreement established between WiFiManager and its users. The users who participated in the study opted-in as volunteers with informed consent; the analysis was conducted under a well-established IRB, and no personally identifiable information such as phone number was collected. We never (and have no way to) link collected data such as BSSID and device location to users’ true identities.

### 2.2 LAN Attack Detection

To detect LAN-side attacks, we develop a novel method called *cross-connection gateway-consistency detection*. Our scheme first broadcasts ARP Request messages to all the hosts within a subnet to retrieve the LAN information and configurations of the examined AP, and then runs consistency checking with cross-connection and historic data to accurately detect the attacks. As to be detailed shortly, in real-world operational scenarios, such additional data help to rule out various false positives that traditional detection methods (*e.g.*, ARP cache consistency checking [26]) may fall into.

**ARP Spoofing Detection.** A user device leverages ARP to map the IP address of another device in the LAN to its corresponding MAC address. In ARP spoofing, a local network attacker broadcasts




Figure 2: Workflow of WiSC, which crowdsourced data from WiFiManager users for WiFi security checking.




Figure 3: Workflow of our ARP spoofing detection.

spoofed ARP Response messages that associate her own MAC address with the gateway’s IP address [58]. If the user device accepts such messages, its future local network traffic will be directed to the attacker instead of the actual gateway.

Our detection is performed by examining changes in the gateway’s (IP, MAC) address pair, a classic method for detecting ARP spoofing. As depicted in Figure 3, when a user device initially connects to an AP, the client of WiSC records the gateway’s (IP, MAC) address pair by scanning the user device’s ARP cache table, denoted as  $(IP_0, MAC_0)$ . Then when performing security checking, we compare the current gateway’s (IP, MAC) address pair, denoted as  $(IP_1, MAC_1)$ , with the recorded one. However, this consistency checking [26] is prone to false positives stemming from ARP cache eviction [54]. Thus, before security checking, we update the user device’s ARP cache table by querying for the corresponding MAC addresses of all the possible IP addresses in the subnet, and then record each (IP, MAC) address pair when it is updated, so as to prevent ARP cache eviction from affecting our results. If the gateway’s MAC address changes but the associated IP address remains ( $MAC_0 \neq MAC_1$  and  $IP_0 = IP_1$ ), we determine that the AP is under ARP spoofing.

It is worth noting that when the criterion above does not hold, it is still possible that the AP is under ARP spoofing—the AP may have already been compromised at the connection establishment (AP association) time (*i.e.*,  $MAC_0$  is already the attacker’s MAC address and thus equals to  $MAC_1$ ). In this case, the gateway’s IP address and the attacker’s own IP address should have been both mapped to the attacker’s MAC address. Thus, if we find that there exists a MAC address mapped to two different IP addresses in the ARP cache table, we also conclude that the AP is under ARP spoofing.

<sup>1</sup>We cannot directly initiate security checking since this action violates the user agreement established between WiFiManager and its users. However, we note that this design may introduce certain bias into our dataset since users (probably professional ones) may have already noticed abnormality before they intentionally launch security checks.




Figure 4: Workflow of our DHCP spoofing detection.

**DHCP Spoofing Detection.** When a user device connects to an AP, it first broadcasts DHCP Discovery messages within the LAN to acquire the gateway’s IP address. In DHCP spoofing, upon receiving such messages, the attacker sends spoofed DHCP Offer messages claiming that her own IP address is the gateway’s IP address [77]. If the spoofed messages reach the user device earlier than the legitimate ones and are accepted, the attacker can intercept its future traffic.

To detect DHCP spoofing, one direct solution is to examine changes in the gateway’s IP address recorded by the user device [26]. However, this does not work in practice since in the design of DHCP, neither does the gateway periodically broadcast its IP address within the LAN, nor does the user device periodically query to check/update the gateway’s IP address. Another solution proposed in prior work is to detect DHCP spoofing by continuously monitoring duplicate DHCP messages within the LAN [66], but this requires root privileges and incurs enormous overhead on the user device. To the best of our knowledge, there is no existing method that can detect DHCP spoofing without root privileges.

To address these, we design a novel *cross-connection* approach that compares the current gateway’s address pair  $(IP_1, MAC_1)$  with the gateway’s address pair  $(IP_0, MAC_0)$  recorded in the *last-time secure connection*, as depicted in Figure 4. We define *last-time secure connection* as the user device’s latest connection to the examined AP, *i.e.*, with the same BSSID,<sup>2</sup> when the connection is determined by WiSC as *benign*; occasionally, if there are no benign connections recorded for the AP, we simply use the latest connection. Then, if the gateway’s IP and MAC addresses have both changed ( $MAC_0 \neq MAC_1$  and  $IP_0 \neq IP_1$ ), we *suspect* that the examined AP is under DHCP spoofing. Note that switching to another WiFi network will not trigger this suspicious case, as the last-time secure connection ensures that the user device connects to the same network (*i.e.*, with the same BSSID).

In the above suspicious case, it is possible that the gateway’s changes in IP and MAC addresses are benign—such changes might be legitimately performed by network administrators. To address this issue, we add additional logic shown in Figure 4. We check whether the AP was used as the gateway in the last-time secure connection—this can be identified by checking whether the AP’s

<sup>2</sup>A BSSID (Basic Service Set Identifier) is derived from the AP’s MAC address, and they are usually identical except when the AP supports multiple service sets [25]. If the AP supports multiple service sets, the BSSID of one of the service sets will be identical with the AP’s MAC address.

BSSID equals the gateway’s MAC address ( $BSSID = MAC_0$ ). If true, it is certain that the AP’s MAC address is used as its BSSID (a common practice) and thus the AP’s MAC address is  $MAC_0$ . Since  $MAC_0$  is the gateway’s MAC address in the last-time secure connection, we can then confirm that the AP was used as the gateway.

Provided that the AP was used as the gateway according to the above examination, and the gateway’s changes (in IP and MAC addresses) are legitimate, the AP’s IP address should stay in the same subnet with the user device’s IP address. This is because the 802.11 standard declares that only one logical network segment (*i.e.*, one IP subnet) can exist under a Basic Service Set (BSS, including all the devices connected to the AP and the AP itself) [25]. Since the AP’s IP address and the user device’s IP address are in the same subnet, and ARP cache table update is performed at the beginning of our examination,  $MAC_0$  should show up in the user device’s ARP cache table. On the other hand, if the gateway’s changes are caused by DHCP spoofing, this may not hold because a stealthy attacker often uses a different subnet for her new gateway (otherwise address conflict will occur as the attacker does not know which addresses have been allocated by the real gateway). Thus, if  $MAC_0$  is not in the user device’s ARP cache table, we can rule out the possibility of legitimate gateway changes, and conclude that the AP is under DHCP spoofing.

**Trade-offs Made in LAN Attack Detection.** In our design, we make several trade-offs to achieve our goal of high precision without root privileges and long-term passive traffic monitoring. In ARP spoofing detection, we assume the adversary does not deliberately hide herself from other devices in the LAN by fabricating their MAC addresses or concealing their IP addresses, since the only known effective method to uncover this is continuously and passively monitoring all broadcasts within the LAN. In DHCP spoofing detection, we conservatively determine all APs not being used as gateways (which account for 12.2% of all APs) as benign to ensure the detection precision. Further, our cross-connection approach does not need root privileges or long-term passive monitoring, but can only examine the cases when user devices are repeatedly connected to the same AP, leading to possible false negatives. Also, since DHCP spoofing detection relies on the temporal consistency between the gateway’s IP and MAC address pairs of current connection and the *last-time secure connection*, it can leave out some malicious APs (*i.e.*, introduce false negatives) if they are already compromised upon the initial connection, in which case there is no available last-time secure connection. These design choices enable us to more easily deploy WiSC while achieving low false positive, so as to ensure the validity of our subsequent WiFi threat analysis.

## 2.3 WAN Attack Detection

For WAN attacks, we target the man-in-the-middle threat model where adversaries can easily launch TCP/DNS hijacking attacks and then *redirect* or *manipulate* traffic flows without users’ knowledge. Under this threat model, even packets with *unreachable destination IP addresses* are highly likely to trigger the hijacking behavior since it is much easier to fabricate spoofed responses than to check the actual reachability of packets’ destination IP addresses [31, 90]. Thus, we devise *cross-layer decoy-based detection* which starts with a transport-layer detection that sends decoy IP packets with




Figure 5: Workflow of our WAN attack detection process.

unreachable destination IP addresses, and uses the response rates to determine the suspicious APs in terms of TCP/DNS hijacking. For the suspicious APs, we then perform an application-layer detection to further rule out possible false positives. In this design, transport-layer detection acts as a quick filtering scheme of benign cases, so as to reduce the relatively high network overhead for performing application-layer scrutinizing. The flowchart of the detection process is shown in Figure 5.

**2.3.1 Transport-Layer Attack Detection.** In the transport-layer detection step, we assemble several decoy IP packets with mostly unreachable destination IP addresses, which are randomly selected from an IP list that excludes easy-to-recognize IP addresses summarized in previous studies [34]. To make these decoys particularly attractive to attackers, we mimic web traffic by craftinging TCP handshake segments with destination port 80, and DNS queries of domain names randomly selected from Alexa’s list of popular websites (*e.g.*, Baidu.com) [5]. This is because web traffic has been a major target of WiFi attacks due to its wide usage and richness in privacy data, making it an excellent “bait”.

We then send out our decoys and monitor their responses in a 5-second time window (5 seconds is a typical user’s tolerance of waiting according to previous studies [12, 49, 70]). Specifically, to mimic regular user behaviors, we send  $S_T = 8$  TCP packets to the AP, which is the maximum number of parallel connections supported by common web browsers. Meanwhile, we also emulate the timeout-retry process of DNS querying by sequentially sending  $S_D = 3$  DNS packets, with a 2-second inter-packet delay, given the 5-second detection time window and the 2-second timeout value of the DNS protocol. We then determine the AP as *suspicious* for 1) TCP hijacking if at least  $R_T$  out of the  $S_T$  TCP packets have responses, and 2) DNS hijacking if at least  $R_D$  out of the  $S_D$  DNS queries have responses. For these cases, we then apply application-layer detection to reduce false positives as detailed later in §2.3.3.

The above detection method is generally robust against deliberate evasion of knowledgeable adversaries for three reasons. First, our generated decoy packets are basically indistinguishable from normal ones, thereby preventing adversaries from identifying them without incurring high overheads on their sides. Second, our parameter

Table 1: Notations and their definitions.

Notation	Definition
$S_T$	Amount of TCP decoys sent to the AP
$S_D$	Amount of DNS decoys sent to the AP
$R_T$	Threshold for the amount of TCP decoys’ responses
$R_D$	Threshold for the amount of DNS decoys’ responses
$P_m$	Probability of receiving responses from a malicious AP
$P_b$	Probability of receiving responses from a benign AP
$R$	Amount of received responses
$\mathbb{P}(R \geq k)$	Probability of an AP’s requiring app-layer scrutinizing
$\mathbb{P}(R = k   \oplus)$	Probability of receiving $k$ responses for a <i>malicious</i> AP
$\mathbb{P}(R = k   \ominus)$	Probability of receiving $k$ responses for a <i>benign</i> AP

settings for generating decoy packets are adjustable as the circumstances may require; the adjustment strategy is discussed in §2.3.2. Third, if an adversary alters her attack patterns (*e.g.*, responding to much fewer packets) to largely evade our detection, her attack effectiveness and profits will be directly impaired.

**2.3.2 Data-driven Parameter Settings.** In this section, we take a data-driven approach to systematically set  $R_T$  and  $R_D$ , the key parameters in our transport-layer detection. We list the related notations and definitions in Table 1. To determine  $R_T$ , we use two intuitions: 1) if the AP is malicious, due to random packet loss or various timeouts, the probability of receiving a response for every decoy is not 100% (denoted as  $P_m < 1$ ), and 2) occasionally receiving a response for some decoys from a benign AP is still possible ( $P_b \geq 0$ ), when a random destination happens to be reachable. Thus, lowering  $R_T$  or  $R_D$  may cause false positives (so more cases need to be scrutinized by the app-layer detection) while increasing them tends to incur false negatives. We next use real-world data-driven statistical modeling to balance this critical tradeoff.

First, to understand how different thresholds affect the percentage of suspicious APs, we conduct an experiment as a beta component (explicitly marked as “for experimental use only” in the UI) of WiFiManager for a month in Sept. 2018. For an opt-in user, its client sends out  $S_T$  decoys for TCP hijacking detection and  $S_D$  decoys for DNS hijacking detection, and then records the number of received responses  $R$ . In total, ~10,000 APs were tested and ~20,000 records were collected. Figure 6 shows the percentage of APs that need scrutinizing (*i.e.*, when the client received at least  $R_T = k$  responses) for different  $k$  values, which we denote as  $\mathbb{P}(R \geq k)$ , whose conditional probabilities given the AP is malicious ( $\oplus$ ) or benign ( $\ominus$ ) are modeled by the binomial distribution:

$$\begin{cases} \mathbb{P}(R = k | \oplus) = \mathbb{P}_B(k; S_T, P_m) = \binom{S_T}{k} P_m^k (1 - P_m)^{(S_T - k)}, \\ \mathbb{P}(R = k | \ominus) = \mathbb{P}_B(k; S_T, P_b) = \binom{S_T}{k} P_b^k (1 - P_b)^{(S_T - k)}. \end{cases} \quad (1)$$

Given  $R = k$ , the recall equals to the probability of a malicious AP receiving  $R \geq k$  responses:

$$recall = \mathbb{P}(R \geq k | \oplus) = \sum_{i=k}^{S_T} \mathbb{P}(R = i | \oplus). \quad (2)$$

From Eq. (1) and Eq. (2) we know that to calculate the recall, we need to obtain the unknown  $P_m$ . To this end, according to the Bayes’ theorem, we have:

$$\mathbb{P}(R = k) = \sum_{S \in \{\oplus, \ominus\}} \mathbb{P}(R = k | S) \mathbb{P}(S). \quad (3)$$




Figure 6: % of APs that need app-layer scrutinizing, and estimated recall for different TCP thresholds.




Figure 7: % of APs that need app-layer scrutinizing, and estimated recall for different DNS thresholds.




Figure 8: False positive and false negative rates for different TCP thresholds.




Figure 9: False positive and false negative rates for different DNS thresholds.




Figure 10: Top 10 WiFi AP brands ordered by the number of examined APs.




Figure 11: Top 10 AP brands ordered by the number of malicious APs detected.

With Eq. (1) (3) and the values of  $\mathbb{P}(R = k)$  from our empirical data, we can solve that  $P_m = 98\%$ . This is generally consistent with the measurement result in prior work [37]. As shown in Figure 6,  $R_T = 5$  is empirically a “sweet spot” as it efficiently filters out 96.6% APs while incurring little loss of recall.

For  $R_D$  (the DNS case), we apply the same mechanism and find  $P_m = 94.12\%$ . Figure 7 shows the corresponding recall and  $R_D = 2$  is found to be a proper balance for our tradeoff.

**2.3.3 Application-Layer Detection.** After the transport-layer detection, the set of suspicious APs for TCP/DNS hijacking behaviors may have false positives. For example, possible *benign interceptions* of APs that intercept and respond to users’ packets in a similar way as that in adversaries’ attacks. Besides, ISPs may implement DNS interceptions [41] for routing optimizations. To rule out these possibilities, we further employ two scrutinizing strategies at the application layer for confirming TCP and DNS hijacking behaviors respectively. Note that the trade-off here is that we conservatively determine an AP as benign as long as we do not detect application-layer attacks, which is thus able to avoid false positives but can introduce some false negatives.

For DNS hijacking, we examine the received resolution results of our DNS decoys (if any). Recall that the decoys’ carried domain names are randomly selected from a list of popular websites. Thus, for the suspicious APs, we determine them as malicious if the resolved IP addresses conform to any of the following 3 criteria: 1)

these IP addresses have been publicly reported as malicious, 2) they are private IP addresses, and 3) they are identical, all of which should not be observed in benign DNS interceptions.

For TCP hijacking, we perform the detection at the web page level. Specifically, we host an instrumented decoy web page on WiSC’s server, and let the client query for it. To detect attacks, a direct method is to compare the received web page at the client with the original one. However, this can have false positives when legitimate log-in web portal exists. To rule out these cases, we insert 256-bit random strings into the HTML of our web page as its “fingerprints.” By checking the fingerprints, we can have high precision in detecting the attacks that do not completely replace web pages but only modify them, *e.g.*, inserting new content [60]. In the design of our web page, we also insert HTTPS links to capture HTTPS-targeted attacks like SSLStrip [65], which undermines HTTPS by replacing HTTPS links in web pages with HTTP links.

## 2.4 Evaluation

**Setup.** To evaluate WiSC’s performance (in terms of false positive and false negative rates), we conduct controlled experiments by respectively replaying the targeted attacks (*i.e.*, ARP/DHCP spoofing and TCP/DNS hijacking) on 10 APs of different brands (as listed in Figure 10) and detecting them with WiSC. For environment settings, we setup our experiments in a campus area where 5 WiFi signals simultaneously exist (a common scenario in public places according

to WiFiManager’s user data); all the signals lie in different channels so that they do not pose direct interference to each other.

**LAN Attack Detection.** In the evaluation of LAN-side attack detection, we replay ARP and DHCP spoofing attacks without introducing the trade-off scenarios as discussed in §2.2, in which we would always conservatively determine the AP as benign in pursuit of an extremely low false positive rate. As a result, evaluations show that all the replayed ARP and DHCP spoofing attacks can be correctly detected by WiSC, mostly attributed to our careful examinations of cross-connection and historic data.

**WAN Attack Detection.** For WAN attack detection, we focus on evaluating the effectiveness of our crucial parameter settings in the transport-layer detection, as well as the overall performance. In detail, we first diagnose the APs using solely the transport-layer detection when the APs are benign and under TCP/DNS hijacking attacks, respectively. Figure 8 shows the false positive and false negative rates for different parameter settings ( $R_T$ ) in the TCP case. As shown, our determined threshold  $R_T = 5$  is still a practical balance for the tradeoff between false positive and false negative, as it effectively reduces false positive (thereby requiring less unnecessary app-layer scrutinizing) to 0.048% while incurring only 0.82% false negative. For the DNS case, Figure 9 illustrates the corresponding false positive/false negative for different  $R_D$  values, and  $R_D = 2$  is also shown to be the proper choice.

Further, we include the app-layer scrutinizing to evaluate the overall performance of our WAN attack detection component. The results show that due to the rigorous rules applied in the app-layer detection, the identified attacks contain no false positive, while there is a slight increase of false negative from 0.82% (1.9%) to 1.3% (2.2%) for the TCP (DNS) case.

## 2.5 Large-Scale Deployment and Field Survey

We collaborated with WiFiManager and implemented WiSC as an optional function of WiFiManager for all its users. During the six-month measurement from 10/22/2018 to 04/03/2019, we recorded a total of 14M opt-in users and 19M WiFi APs, distributed in 178 countries; the vast majority are located in China where WiFiManager’s major users come from. To further confirm the validity of our dataset, with the WiFiManager team we carry out a field survey of 100 randomly selected public APs that are determined to be malicious by WiSC. We choose public APs given that they can be easily located (using the location data provided by users), accessed and tested. Also, we ensure that all the concerned attacks are included in this survey. Field results show that all the sampled APs indeed manifest malicious behaviors upon close examinations, indicating that our dataset is able to provide a valid basis for our analyses.

## 3 MEASUREMENT RESULTS

Among all the 19M APs examined by WiSC, we record 445 AP brands, 2660 AP models, and ~750,000 APs bearing WiFi attacks, corresponding to ~1,413,000 attack event traces. To our knowledge, this is so far the largest study regarding WiFi APs and related security events in the wild. By analyzing this, we have multifold findings on WiFi threats as follows.

**Table 2: Top 15 countries ordered by the number of examined WiFi APs.**

Country	# of APs	Prevalence	Major Attack Technique
China	19,119,764	3.92%	TCP hijacking (57.6%)
Burma	7148	4.48%	TCP hijacking (53.1%)
Vietnam	4288	1.8%	DHCP spoofing (40.2%)
Russia	3169	8.93%	DNS hijacking (43.8%)
South Korea	2701	2.07%	ARP spoofing (91.1%)
Cambodia	2213	2.17%	ARP spoofing (47.9%)
Laos	1530	1.05%	DHCP spoofing (43.7%)
Thailand	1350	4.15%	DNS hijacking (53.5%)
Malaysia	1317	2.89%	DNS hijacking (44.7%)
Japan	1315	2.59%	ARP spoofing (67.6%)
Singapore	1133	1.5%	ARP spoofing (50%)
Philippines	840	2.86%	DNS hijacking (45.8%)
Indonesia	796	22.36%	TCP hijacking (91%)
United States	608	1.01%	ARP spoofing (66.6%)
Pakistan	523	1.53%	ARP Spoofing (62.5%)

## 3.1 Prevalence of WiFi Attacks

Previous reports with small-scale measurements suggest that WiFi attacks occur to only 0.21%–1.5% of their examined WiFi APs [67, 69]. Unfortunately, our large-scale, in-the-wild measurement refutes this, revealing that WiFi attacks have been detected on at least 3.92% of all the 19M APs. Worse still, as our detection scheme cannot cover every possible form of attack such as signal monitoring and deauth [7, 43] occurring at the PHY or MAC layer, the prevalence (~4%) in fact only represents a *lower bound* of the reality, indicating a pressing demand for the community’s attention today.

In detail, we wonder whether the AP brand impacts the prevalence of attacks, since different AP manufacturers may have distinct security considerations. We plot the top 10 AP brands in Figure 10 and Figure 11 in terms of number of examined and malicious APs, respectively. We observe that among all the malicious APs, top 10 brands account for 98.48%. Most notably, nearly half (49%) of them belong to a single brand—Phicomm [53], whose market share is merely 4.3%. Such a highly skewed distribution can be ascribed to Phicomm APs’ specific security vulnerabilities, since we notice that online reports or discussions around Phicomm APs’ vulnerabilities are much more common than those of others [61, 62]. Although public vulnerability disclosures can help improve the security of the products, we have not seen Phicomm act effectively in response. Thus, before the patches for these public vulnerabilities are developed and applied, it would be beneficial for the concerned APs to deploy short-term mitigation strategies such as the novel *MAC address randomization* [6] technique that can help hide vulnerable APs’ device fingerprints.

Moreover, for geographical distribution, we list in Table 2 the top 15 countries with the largest number of examined APs among all the involved 178 countries. As shown, some countries like Burma, Russia, and Thailand exhibit even higher prevalence (>4%) of WiFi attacks than China. We note that our results may not be applicable to some of the countries due to limited data scale and the lack of similarity between their manifested behaviors and those of China. However, for countries exhibiting a similar WiFi threat landscape as in China (in terms of prevalence, major types of attacks, and essential behaviors), such as Burma, we propose that our results may be valuable for them as well. Further, by analyzing the geographical




Figure 12: Internet connectivity for APs with strong and weak/no encryption.




Figure 13: Status quo of top websites' HTTPS/HSTS adoption in China and the US.




Figure 14: Connectivity for benign APs and APs under spoofing attacks.




Figure 15: Connectivity for benign APs and APs under hijacking attacks.




Figure 16: Physical movement of benign APs and malicious APs.




Figure 17: Frequency of attackers injecting ads to victims' web pages.

distribution of the detected WiFi attacks in China, we confirm that WiFi attacks pervasively exist in almost all areas across the country, without being confined to specific areas or ISPs. Also, the density of attacks is basically proportional to the population density.

### 3.2 WiFi-based Attack Techniques

The WiFi-based attack techniques used in the wild are found to be heterogeneous and somewhat unexpected. The ratios of the four attack techniques WiSC can detect are: TCP hijacking (57%), DNS hijacking (17%), ARP spoofing (16%), and DHCP spoofing (12%). Multiple attack techniques can happen to one AP, so their percentages add up to more than 100%. Although the techniques themselves have all been studied in prior work [2, 17, 41, 72], we have several findings that are unknown or significantly different.

First, we observe that TCP hijacking accounts for over a half of the detected attacks. This can be attributed to TCP's dominating use today for Internet applications, and the attackers' strong capability in undermining TCP connections or even encryptions. In principle, the increasingly wide deployment of HTTPS across the globe should be able to provide protection against TCP hijacking. However, our results clearly indicate that such attacks are still rampant.

To deeply understand the situation, we further measure the HTTPS adoption in the wild, and reveal a staggering lack of *effective* HTTPS deployment in many countries. Figure 13 shows the case of top 100 and top 10,000 websites in China and the US according to the Alexa Traffic Ranking [5]. We find that although HTTPS is widely

supported in both countries, quite a few websites do not use HTTPS as default. Besides, more websites (60% in China and 36% in the US for the top 100 websites) do not enable HSTS (HTTP Strict Transport Security [30]), leaving themselves vulnerable to HTTPS downgrade attacks such as SSLStrip.

Worse still, even for those websites who have enabled HSTS, we notice that the vast majority of them (92.5% in China and 78.1% in the US for the top 100 websites) fail to properly configure HSTS parameters (*e.g.*, timeout threshold and preload list), rendering HSTS ineffective in practice. For example, TMall [83], a major online shopping platform in China, configures its HSTS timeout threshold as zero, resulting in an immediate expiration of HSTS upon accesses, thereby letting HSTS be completely bypassed.

In terms of LAN attacks, recall that WiFiManager helps user devices examine their connectivity (LAN connectivity) with APs. Specifically, it measures the connection latency on a user device by periodically pinging the gateway. Figure 14 and Figure 15 depict the distributions of connectivity for benign APs and the APs under different attacks. As shown in Figure 14, both spoofing attacks are more detected on the APs with poorer LAN connectivity, because they can succeed more easily under worse LAN environments, which allow spoofed responses to reach user devices faster than the legitimate ones. Interestingly, Figure 15 makes an opposite observation: DNS and TCP hijacking attacks are more likely to occur on good network conditions. We will elaborate this in §3.3.



In previous studies, DHCP spoofing was mostly a hypothetical attack under WiFi networks, since all DHCP Discovery messages must be first sent to and then broadcast by the AP. Thus, the AP should be able to respond to such messages more quickly than adversaries [56, 87], rendering any spoofed DHCP Offer messages invalid. However, our observation refutes this by revealing that DHCP spoofing is as feasible as other popular techniques in practice. We suspect that the attackers adopt some extreme strategies, such as flooding DHCP Offer messages, to practically increase the success rate. Such strategies can be especially effective when the LAN connectivity is poor (also suggested by Figure 14).

To sum up, the root cause of ARP/DHCP spoofings lies in the AP's unconditionally forwarding all the broadcasts within the LAN, which conforms to the design of Ethernet for historical reasons, and can be thoroughly address them by performing packet checking or encryption at the AP, *e.g.*, through *S-ARP* [13] and *DHCP snooping* [2]. However, they can also incur non-trivial storage/computation overhead since they rely on recording all DHCP traffic or asymmetric cryptography, which may incur additional attack surfaces and are impractical for residential APs with low-cost hardware.

An alternative may be *MAC-forced forwarding* [44] that enables an AP to recognize ARP/DHCP messages within the LAN, and selectively forward them instead of simply broadcasting them all. In fact, this technique has been deployed in some public places (*e.g.*, metro stations) to defend against spoofing [89]. In our data, we find that 3,208 APs are using this technique, and the MAC addresses for all the connected user devices within the LAN obtained by ARP requests are exactly the gateway's MAC address, indicating that all ARP traffic within the LAN has been explicitly directed to and managed by the AP (gateway). It is encouraging to see that no spoofing attack was detected on any of these 3,208 APs.

### 3.3 Malicious Behaviors and Objectives

Our measurement collects 1.4M attack event traces, including both transport- and application-layer responses for detailed attack behavior analysis. We make several interesting observations regarding the “semantics” of such attacks.

- First, we analyze the collected web pages, and notice that 55% of the attack events involve web pages being injected with advertisements (ad injection) mainly through TCP hijacking.
- Second, 26% are typical DoS and passive traffic monitoring through ARP/DHCP spoofing, where attackers manage to trick user devices into recognizing their devices as the network gateway, thereby dropping packets or peeping at users' network traces.
- Third, we observe DNS hijacking where users' DNS queries receive false resolution results, leading to potential phishing attacks, *i.e.*, redirection to malicious websites elaborately disguised as the originally requested ones.
- Fourth, HTTPS-targeted attacks such as SSLStrip are also identified, where HTTPS links have been surreptitiously replaced with HTTP links to compromise users' encryption.

The last two account for <8% of all attacks, which is much smaller than the percentages reported in prior studies [19, 28].

Delving deep, as shown in Figure 16, we notice that APs under LAN attacks exhibit much longer physical movements (median


of 724 m, average of 47.3 km) than APs under WAN attacks and benign APs (median of 31 m and 21 m, average of 20.4 km and 20.5 km, respectively). Here the average is much larger than the median due to the existence of mobile APs such as smartphone-based hotspots, and small movements (<50 m) are mostly due to user-side localization errors. We attribute this phenomenon to our observation that ARP/DHCP spoofing attacks are more likely to succeed under poor LAN environments (see Figure 14), which can be more easily noticed by network administrators and then get fixed, compared to the finer networks of WAN-based attacks. Thus, attackers need to strategically relocate (similar events have been noticed in other attacks [39]) to better success and evade detection. Notably, we find that 10% of the APs under LAN attacks even manifest a clear pattern of shifting around several locations, forming one or multiple loops.

Next, we go deeper into the most detected events—ad injections, and make several intriguing findings. We discover that the injected ads are not deliberately hidden through techniques like impression fraud [76], although in this way adversaries can better cover themselves up to avoid being directly captured by users. This is probably because advertisers require ads to be explicitly displayed for achieving real advertising effect. This suggests that there might exist an ecosystem behind these widespread AP-based ad injection activities, thus motivating us to dig deeper in the next section.


More surprisingly, ad injection is detected on 2.33% of the APs using strong encryption (WPA/WPA2) while on 1% of the APs using no or weak encryption (WEP). Our investigation sheds light on this counter-intuitive observation. WiFiManager measures the Internet connectivity of an AP when checking its LAN connectivity (§3.2). The result falls into four categories: *Excellent*, *Good*, *Average*, *Poor*, representing that in monthly examinations, >90%, 70%~90%, 50%~70%, <50% connections can be established, respectively. Figure 12 shows that better protected APs tend to have better Internet connectivity, thereby providing a better network environment for performing ad injection. The above results probably indicate that solely relying on strong link-layer cryptography may be ineffective against complex real-world threats, whose mitigation requires a cross-layer approach spanning multiple dimensions including encryption, authentication, protocol verification, human factor, to name a few. For example, mitigating the ad-injection attack requires the synergy from secure app-layer protocol (*e.g.*, HTTPS) and robust authentication (*e.g.*, dynamic authentication offered by 802.1X [16]).

### 3.4 Fundamental Motives Behind the Attacks


According to our results, ad injection currently accounts for the largest portion of the detected attacks events and thus has the broadest impact on end users. Also, user devices being injected with ads can fall victim of various kinds of frauds and abuses, leading to possible severe outcomes. Therefore, in this section, we leverage our in-situ attack event traces to understand the fundamental motives behind the AP-based ad injections. By analyzing the injection code, we first observe that adversaries adopt various techniques to evade common security checks, such as domain altering that constantly changes ads' domains to prevent security or ad-blocking software from recognizing them, and code obfuscation to hide the attack logic. Clearly, the attackers are trying hard to conceal their malicious activities while profiting by (visible) ad impression.



**Figure 18: Percentage of APs that recover through reset/upgrade for each week and our fitting curve.**



**Figure 19: Percentage of recovered APs influenced by ad injection probabilities and our fitting curve.**



**Figure 20: Our inferred profit model that shows how the profit varies for different ad injection probabilities.**

Meanwhile, we find that a malicious AP only probabilistically injects ads instead of compromising all intercepted web pages. As shown in Figure 17, for 77% of the malicious APs, the ad injection probabilities are below the average, 17%. We believe that qualitatively, this is because excessive ad injection can be easily noticed by users, henceforth incurring AP reset, firmware upgrade, or even disconnection, causing the attacker to lose the comprised AP. Nevertheless, we are more interested in the quantitative explanation: how do attackers choose the injection probability (frequency) we observe? Is it the result of a mature market’s selection or simply the aggregation of random standalone cases? These are essential to further decoding the WiFi attack ecosystem (if it exists).

To answer the above questions, we analytically model the economy behind ad-injection attacks. Instead of assuming a fixed number of malicious APs, we notice that more realistically, malicious APs are only under adversaries’ control for a period of time, before they gradually *recover* to the benign state—a dynamic process. Intuitively, malicious APs’ recovery can be attributed to users’ intentional defense actions triggered by relatively high ad injection probabilities. Moreover, the APs can also recover through users’ unintentional actions, *e.g.*, AP reset or firmware upgrade. We expect these two factors to independently influence APs’ recovery.

To obtain the percentage of APs recovered through unintentional actions (when ad injection probability is low), we choose to inspect the 35,782 APs that experience the lowest ad injection probability (0.02) during our measurement to exclude the influence of high-probability ad injections arousing users’ vigilance. We track their recovery process for 14 weeks, and plot the percentage of recovered APs ( $\mathbb{P}_F$ ) for each week ( $t$ ) in Figure 18. As an AP’s recovery is an independent and random event, we fit the measurement data using Exponential distribution [10]:

$$\mathbb{P}_F(t) = 1 - e^{-0.054t}. \quad (4)$$

We find that the *coefficient of determination* ( $R^2$ ) [46] is as high as 0.89, suggesting that  $\mathbb{P}_F(t)$  can well fit our data.

Recall that for all recovered APs, we divide them into two parts: 1) the APs recovered due to intentional defense actions, and 2) the APs recovered through unintentional actions. Since we know the number of all recovered APs (Part 1 + Part 2) for each week, we can estimate the size of Part 1 by first approximating the size of Part 2 with Eq. (4) and then removing it from the total size. Next,

we calculate the average ad injection probability for each week with our dataset. Figure 19 then plots the percentage of recovered APs ( $\mathbb{P}_L$ ) due to intentional defense actions for different ad injection probabilities, which exhibits the curve of an S-function [35]. Among common S-functions, we find that the Bertalanffy function [86] can best fit our data with  $R^2$  being 0.99:

$$\mathbb{P}_L(P_{ad}) = 0.95 * (1 - 1.99e^{-10.12P_{ad}-0.67})^3, \quad (5)$$

for an injection probability  $P_{ad}$ . We therefore have the probability for an AP’s remaining malicious ( $\mathbb{P}_m$ ) at time  $t$ :

$$\mathbb{P}_m(P_{ad}, t) = (1 - \mathbb{P}_L(P_{ad}))(1 - \mathbb{P}_F(t)). \quad (6)$$

Suppose there are a total number of  $M$  APs, each AP is injected with an average of  $N$  ads, and each ad brings a unit profit of  $Profit_{unit}$ ; then the adversaries’ profit would be:

$$Profit(P_{ad}) = \sum_{t=0}^{\infty} M * N * Profit_{unit} * P_{ad} * \mathbb{P}_m(P_{ad}, t) \quad (7)$$

for injection probability  $P_{ad}$ . Although the exact values of  $M$ ,  $N$ , and  $Profit_{unit}$  are unknown, we can know how  $Profit(P_{ad})$  varies relative to  $Profit(P_{ad} = 1)$  for different  $P_{ad}$  values as:


$$Profit_{relative}(P_{ad}) = \frac{Profit(P_{ad})}{Profit(1)} = \frac{P_{ad}(1 - \mathbb{P}_L(P_{ad}))}{1 - \mathbb{P}_L(1)}. \quad (8)$$

We plot  $Profit_{relative}(P_{ad})$  for different  $P_{ad}$  values in Figure 20 to showcase how different ad injection probabilities impact adversaries’ profit. As shown, the maximum profit appears at  $P_{ad} = 15\%$ , which matches real-world adversaries’ choices (averaging at 17%). With this finding, we suspect that most adversaries have carefully tuned their behaviors to achieve maximum profit in the long run.

In summary, we notice that most adversaries carry out ad-injection attacks in a rather mature manner through rate throttling, which can not only prevent users from easily noticing them but also maximize their profits. The high consistency between our analytical results and attackers’ real-world practices suggests *these attackers are both judicious and rational, revealing a rather mature ecosystem*, which we discuss next.

## 4 UNDERMINING ATTACK ECOSYSTEM

In this section, we first describe how we figure out the underground WiFi attack ecosystem. Then, we present the interplay among the



**Figure 21: Procedure of uncovering web analytics platforms in the underground ecosystem of WiFi attacks.**

various players in the ecosystem. Next, we show how we discover its Achilles’ heel that enables our subsequent proactive counterstriking.

### 4.1 Uncovering the Underground Ecosystem

Our analysis in §3.4 implies that an immense, mature ecosystem probably exists behind WiFi attacks. As shown in Figure 21, to fully understand it, we closely examine adversaries’ code that is inserted into the web page as external JavaScript resources. We notice that in >99% of the recorded ad-injection attacks, the injection code consists of two separate JavaScript files: one serves to inject ads, and the other contains code that is inserted through a JavaScript resource link from legitimate domains, most notably `hm.baidu.com`. Tracing this lead, we find out that this domain name belongs to a web analytics platform named Baidu Analytics [9]. By cross-referencing the code with Baidu Analytics’ official documents, we know that the code records various statistics of the advertising effect such as the click-through rate [23] and reports them to the web analytics platform. In total, we discover only four such web analytics platforms: Baidu Analytics, UMeng [85], OeeBee [47], and 360zlzq [1].

These platforms provide traffic and user behavior analysis for a registered link/website, so as to help developers better assess the “effectiveness” of their websites, which in our case is the effectiveness of the injected advertising pages. The piece of code we discover is written as the user end of their statistics collection infrastructure, which monitors and records web traffic on the advertising pages, and uploads corresponding data to web analytics platforms to generate an analytical report. This is a most intriguing finding that quickly leads us to the primary question: *why do adversaries require such services of web analytics if they simply compromise APs and inject ads for themselves?* Considering the function of these web analytics services, their presence hints that the attackers might be interacting with another entity of the ecosystem.

Leveraging this finding, we can now infer the panorama of the WiFi attack ecosystem, where adversaries are not advertisers that produce and distribute ads for marketing purposes. In fact, they mainly act as a proxy that is only responsible for delivering ads to end users for other advertisers. In online advertising, such a role is termed as the *ad-serving platform* [22]. This is the reason why participation of web analytics platforms is required—to provide independent evaluation for the actual advertising effect of the ad-serving platforms. We next detail the interplay among advertisers,

**Table 3: Attackers that stop serving ads after our action.**

Adversary	% of All Ads	Entity We Report to
t.7gg.cc	35.8%	Baidu Analytics
5myr.cn	8.9%	OeeBee
agtsjb.com	8.7%	UMeng/Adblock Plus
103.49.209.27	1.2%	360zlzq/Adblock Plus
withad.com	0.4%	UMeng/Adblock Plus
zfkwm.com	0.3%	UMeng/Adblock Plus
js.union-wifi.com	0.06%	360zlzq/Adblock Plus
172.81.246.180	0.05%	360zlzq/Adblock Plus

adversaries/ad-serving platforms, and web analytics platforms to present how the ecosystem operates, as well as a weak link within.

### 4.2 Interplay and Weakness

Figure 1 (early in §1) depicts the interplay within the WiFi attack ecosystem. First, advertisers hire ad-serving platforms (adversaries) to help distribute ads to end users. Then via malicious APs, ads and statistics collection code are injected into users’ requested web pages. The ads are later displayed to end users. Meanwhile, the statistics collection code tracks users’ interactions with injected ads, and uploads collected statistics to web analytics platforms. At the monetization stage, adversaries use ad analytics signed by web analytics platforms as a proof to receive payment from advertisers.

In detail, we extract the resource links of ad-injection code from the HTML files of logged web pages, and classify them according to the resource links’ domain names or IP addresses. As a result, we identify a total number of 25 ad-serving platforms. In addition, we have observed transnational activities of several adversaries. For example, `5myr.cn`’s activities involve 8 countries, the largest in our data. Also, a major adversary `t.7gg.cc` (which accounts for 36% of all ads) has been detected in 6 countries across 3 continents.

Furthermore, we notice that two largest among the four analytics platforms, Baidu Analytics and UMeng, are third-party authoritative services that take 87% of the market share and participate in distributing 80.8% of the ads. The massive participation of these major legitimate services is surprising, though we believe that they are involved in the ecosystem due to their public credibility. That is, adversaries might be required by advertisers to provide *credible* evidence of their advertising effect to decide the final payment. This phenomenon, on the other side, reveals the Achilles’ heel of the attack ecosystem: *it heavily relies on legitimate web analytics platforms for the most essential monetization stage*. This provides a unique opportunity for active defense (detailed next).

### 4.3 Real-World Active Defense Practices

Given that the ecosystem mainly relies on only four web analytics platforms, we take an active defense approach by contacting them and providing our detailed findings regarding their supported adversaries (ad-serving platforms) in Aug. 2019. As of August 2020, we observe that Baidu Analytics stopped serving 67% of the reported links, resulting in 49.8% decrease of ad injections. For UMeng, we have managed to establish communications with their teams, who have promised to take actions towards the reported ad links in the near future. Shortly after our complaint, OeeBee seems to be shut down according to its website.

While waiting for responses from 360zlzq, we report our identified illegal ad campaigns to mainstream ad blockers and observe real-world effects as well. For example, a major adversary `agtsjb.com`, which accounts for 8.7% of all the ads, has been included in the black-list of Adblock Plus, a popular browser plugin for ad blocking [3]. Later, we find that the related ads have all become inaccessible. Table 3 lists major adversaries that have completely stopped serving their ads (*i.e.*, unable to access them) after our actions.

These efforts mark the first success of active defenses against WiFi attacks by breaking the critical chain of monetization. We realize though that fully defeating the massive, well-organized ecosystem requires joint efforts from other entities like browsers, ad blocks, and OSes. We are actively pursuing this research direction.

## 5 RELATED WORK

**WiFi Security Measurement and Analysis.** There are only a limited number of studies on WiFi security, yet all of them perform measurement or experiments in small-scale environments and/or concerning specific topics. Hu *et al.* [32] study the epidemiology of malware spreading over WiFi by simulating its propagations. Zafft *et al.* [93] measure WiFi threats regarding APs' encryption and black-listed IP addresses. Fleck *et al.* [20] investigate ARP poisoning in WiFi networks. Yin *et al.* [92] send test packets to uncover malicious APs that intercept and relay users' network traffic. Xiong *et al.* [91] explore eavesdropping on WiFi signals at the physical layer. In comparison, we conduct to date the most large-scale, comprehensive WiFi security analysis in the wild, and reveal several new findings such as the prevalent WiFi AP-based ad injection and its ecosystem.

**Understanding Attacks from an Ecosystem Perspective.** Several studies strive to understand different cybercriminal activities, such as account theft [48], malware distribution [14, 81], spam [38, 59, 82], and underground marketing [74] from an ecosystem and/or economic perspective. In particular, Thomas *et al.* [80] present a large-scale measurement on ad injection attacks in Google by embedding content modification detectors in several Google sites. Their results reveal the landscape of the ad ecosystem that primarily consists of ad-serving platforms, advertisers, compromised sites and various attack vectors (*e.g.*, browser extensions, malicious binaries, and routers). They then approach the problem by requesting developers of related browser extensions (a major attack vector) to remove ad injection components from their software. Pearce *et al.* [52] instead focus on the click fraud within the ad ecosystem and complex interplays among closely connected ad-serving platforms (which distribute ads to each other). Different from them, we discover the wide-spread ad injection problem when dissecting WiFi security threats in the wild. More importantly, we disclose yet another player in the ad ecosystem – legitimate web analytics platforms, which we find to be in fact the bottleneck of the entire revenue chain that can be leveraged against adversaries.

**Network Protocol Security in General.** There exist a large body of researches on upper-layer (L2 to L5) network protocol security. They use a wide range of techniques such as traffic-based analysis [8, 64, 68], formal verification [33], OS-level protection [18, 21, 75], software engineering [57, 95], machine learning and statistical analysis [73, 94]. There are also numerous studies (in terms of both attack

and defense) on securing specific protocols such as ARP [13, 42], DHCP [36], HTTP [63, 78], SSL/TLS [30, 79], and DNS [50, 96]. Many of these techniques have been or can be applied to WiFi environments. Our work differs from the above in that instead of focusing on a single protocol or a standalone attack/defense technique, we reveal the landscape of WiFi-related network protocol security. Our measurements provide distinctive key insights for improving WiFi security in the future.

## 6 CONCLUSIONS AND LIMITATIONS

In this paper, we carry out a nationwide measurement study of WiFi security. We develop a lightweight WiFi threat detection system called WiSC that takes advantage of both active probing and complementary cross-layer information. We then deploy WiSC in the wild to examine 19 million WiFi APs connected by 14 million real-world users. With the crowdsourced data, we perform a comprehensive analysis on state-of-the-art WiFi attacks in the wild, the adversaries' profit-driven motives, and the interactions among multiple entities in the WiFi attack ecosystem. We also discover the critical role played by major web analytics platforms on monetizing the adversaries, and leverage it to effectively combat the preponderant ad injection attacks at the national scale.

Despite the above efforts, our dataset and analysis bear several limitations due to real-world constraints stemming from the limited system privileges and resources of WiSC in the large-scale context. First, in the design of WiSC one of our critical considerations is trading some false negatives for a low false positive rate, so as to obtain a valid basis for the WiFi threat analysis. However, in this way we may not be able to capture the full landscape of WiFi threat in the wild. Second, limited by the information WiSC can collect from end devices, some of our analyses and results lack direct evidences and thus may deviate from the actual cause(s) due to other possible impact factors. For them, we conduct best-effort validations through multi-aspect correlation analysis or controlled experiments. Third, our current dataset is inherently unable to provide a clear picture regarding the actual attack vectors that enable adversaries to compromise an AP, as our platform operates at the end side.

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